Th e article presents fundamental characteristics of legislative referendum as the most signifi cant form of direct democracy in Slovenia. In addition, it examines the reasons leading to the amendment of constitutional arrangement of legislative referendum in Slovenia in 2013. Fundamental aspects of judicial and Constitutional Court control of legislative referendum are considered. Focusing on jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and its role in referendum matters in a broader sense, the article also illustrates trends of extensive Constitutional Court practice in referendum matters. An example of a referendum on disputed social issues is illustrated by means of referendums on two acts that have changed the defi nition of family and equalised same-sex and opposite-sex partners. Furthermore, the article tackles the impact that legislative referendum in Slovenia has exerted on the legal and political system of the country. In that context, on the basis of a particular case, it presents the impact of a referendum campaign and acts of individual participants involved upon voters' will.
Introduction
Th e Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinaft er referred as the Constitution) 1 provides all the most relevant and well-known instruments of direct democracy, namely the referendum, popular initiative and citizens' assembly. Judging by the number and the diversity of these instruments, Slovenia ranks among the states with the most developed direct democracy in Europe. 2 Th e aim of this paper is to analyse the role of legislative referendum as the most important and frequently used form of direct democracy in the Republic of Slovenia (hereinaft er referred as Slovenia) in general and its role in resolving problematic social issues, particularly on defi nition of family and same-sex marriages. Another goal of this paper is to open a discussion on whether legislative referendum is an adequate mechanism for dealing with controversial social dilemmas. Part of the analyses focuses on impacts of legislative referendums on Slovenian political and legal system. In addition, the article also presents factors that most infl uence the voters` will and assesses the role of the government and of mass media in the referendum procedure, particularly in the referendum campaign.
General characteristic of referendum decision-making in the Republic of Slovenia
Th e Slovene legal system institutionalizes ten forms of referendum. On the state level these are: the constitutional referendum, the legislative referendum, referendum on international associations and the consultative referendum. On the local level, the following referendums are provided: referendum on a general legal act of a municipality, referendum on statutory issues, referendum on self-imposed contributions, consultative referendum of a municipality, referendum on the establishment and referendum on territorial reorganization of the municipality.
In Slovenia, the legislative referendum is by far the most important and the most frequently used form of direct decision-making. Th e legislative referendum in Slovenia is regulated in Article 90 of the Constitution.
Th e fundamental characteristics of the legislative referendum, prior to constitutional changes in 2013, were its voluntary nature and wide accessibility, the fact that it could be called on any issue, which is the subject of regulation by law, and, fi nally, in order for a decision to pass, a simple majority suffi ced. 3 Th is constitutional regulation of the legislative referendum largely deviated from those of comparable European countries, particularly in regard to the initiative and the restrictions on the subject-matter of the referendum. 4 2
More on the fact that Slovenia is one of the leading European countries regarding direct democracy mechanisms, see: R. Podolnjak, Constitutional Reform of Citizen-Initiated Referendum: Causes of Diff erent Outcomes in Slovenia and Croatia, Revus, 2015, no. 26, p. 131. 3 More on previous arrangement of legislative referendum in Slovenia see: I. Kaučič Based on the above constitutional arrangement, Slovenia encountered signifi cant normative and practical problems when holding referendums. 5 Th e constitutional arrangement of the legislative referendum was one of the most controversial political and expert issues as relatively broad access to the referendum and inadequate normative framework enabled its use for achieving narrow political interests and interests of well-organised civil groups. 6 Aft er years of eff ort by politicians and experts, the constitutional body fi nally passed a constitutional amendment that changed the legislative referendum arrangement in 2013. 7 Since then Article 90 of the Constitution provides: "(1) Th e National Assembly shall call a referendum on the entry into force of a law that was adopted if so required by at least forty thousand voters.
(2) A referendum may not be called on laws on urgent measures to ensure the defence of the state, security, or the elimination of the consequences of natural disasters; on laws on taxes, customs duties, and other compulsory charges, and on the law adopted for the implementation of the state budget; on laws on the ratifi cation of treaties; on laws eliminating an unconstitutionality in the fi eld of human rights and fundamental freedoms or any other unconstitutionality.(3) Th e right to vote in a referendum is held by all citizens who are eligible to vote in elections. (4) A law is rejected in a referendum if a majority of voters who have cast valid votes vote against the law, provided at least one fi ft h of all qualifi ed voters have voted against the law. (5) Referendums are regulated by a law passed in the National Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of deputies present. "
In 2013, the constitutional amendment instead of the confi rmation legislative referendum model established the rejective one. Its purpose is to prevent the enforcement of a law adopted by parliament (a popular veto). 8 At the same time, three main sets of changes were introduced in Slovenian constitutional order i.e.:
changes regarding referendum initiative(according to the new arrangement the referendum can only be proposed by voters 9 ), New York, 2014, pp. 17-121. 5 E.g. a very high number of subjects had the possibility to initiate a referendum, the Constitution did not set any limitations regarding the questions that can be decided upon a legislative referendum, no quorums were provided. More on this see: I. Kaučič More on general characteristics of citizen initiated referendums worldwide see: M. Qvortrup, Direct democracy: a comparative study of the theory and practice of government by the people, limiting the scope of the referendum's subject-matter (establishing referendum restrictions and prohibitions; it is inadmissible to call on referendum for four groups of laws), changes regarding the legitimacy of the referendum decision (establishing a quorum of rejection). 10
Compared with the previous constitutional arrangement of the legislative referendum, the new one represents an important and comprehensive change, based on domestic experience and twenty years of practical use of the legislative referendum as well as on referendum arrangements in some other European countries that can be compared to Slovenia (e.g. Ireland, Denmark, and Italy). 11 Table 1 shows the most important data about holding legislative referendums in Slovenia from 1994 to 2018. 1. Th e Slovenian Referendum and Popular Initiative Act from 1994 initially prescribed two forms of legislative referendum: the subsequent and the preliminary. In the preliminary legislative referendum, the voters` will was expressed in advance on a question that is the subject matter of the legislative referendum. Generally, the preliminary referendum tended to be more consultative in its nature, representing more or less mandatory guidelines for the parliament when adopting a legal act. Slovenia used to apply preliminary referendum but the practice has shown that it complicates the entire legislative procedure. 
Judicial review of the referendum
Th e judicial review of the legislative referendum is a collective denomination for all forms of legal review carried out by the constitutional or other courts or bodies that are competent in each country for the review of the constitutionality and legality of regulations, procedures and decisions in connection with the institute of the legislative referendum. 12 In the broadest sense, all forms of judicial review of the legislative referendum have a common goal, namely to strengthen the confi dence of voters in the fair conduct of the referendum. In the narrower sense, there are several objectives of the judicial review of the legislative referendum, namely to ensure the 12 More on general trends of referendum juridicization see: L. eff ective exercise of referendum rights, to prevent the referendum from being called if all the conditions have not been met, to ensure compliance with the rules of the referendum process and to ensure the credibility and fairness of the referendum decision. 13 In general, authorities exercising judicial review of referendums are sometimes political bodies, 14 but more oft en courts. In this case, it might be an administrative court, other court or constitutional court, which checks the regularity of the referendum procedure and is in charge of reviewing the issue. In this regard we can divide review of legislative referendum into judicial review (if review is carried out by national courts with general or specialised jurisdiction) and constitutional review (when review is carried out by constitutional court). 15
Referendum and the role of the Constitutional court in Slovenia
To a large extent, the importance of judicial review of referendums in a specifi c country refl ects the general situation of judicial review in a particular country. Slovenia has a well-developed system of judicial review, 16 and judicial review in the fi eld of the legislative referendum is no exception. In general, the Constitutional court is authorised to exercise judicial review of the referendums. In line with Articles 53 and 53.a of the Referendum and Popular Initiative Act, 17 Slovenian administrative court and Slovenian Supreme court are authorised for protection of the right to vote in the referendum. With respect to this fact, Slovenia can be classifi ed among those states that divide review of legislative referendum into constitutional and judicial review. 18 Th e constitutional review of the legislative referendum in Slovenia, in consideration of the implementation periods, is carried out as preliminary review, as review of the process during the implementation of the referendum, and as a follow-up review. Within the framework of the preliminary review, the right of initiative of the voters to call for a referendum, the right to demand the calling of a referendum, and the procedure of gathering signatures in support of referendum are protected; within the context of review during the referendum, in particular, the right to vote in a referendum is protected. Within the framework of the protection of the right to 13 More on defi nition and purpose of judicial review of referendums see: demand the calling of a legislative referendum, we also include the assessment of the admissibility of referendum decision-making. Th e reason for this inclusion is that the right to demand the calling of a referendum is already very limited at the outset due to the constitutionally established prohibitions and restrictions of referendum decision-making. 19 Constitutional court practice is highly wide-ranging in regard to review of legislative referendum. In most cases, the Constitutional Court decided on permissibility to call the referendum, while a part of decisions related to other stages of the referendum procedure (gathering signatures in support of referendum, other violations in referendum procedure that is part of legislative procedure in a broader sense, determining the referendum outcome, and review of voting violations in referendum). Constitutional Court review in referendum matters is generally characterised by an in-depth approach, upgrading of case-law and doctrine in the fi eld of referendum review and eff orts for protection of referendum rights. 20 On the other hand, the Constitutional Court was the one to draw attention of the legislator to the shortcomings of the constitutional arrangement of the legislative referendum prior to 2013, and therefore, for a period of time, departed from its previously adopted positions, which initially took the public and the profession by great surprise. 21 Aft er that, case-law settled for a brief period, only to be followed by amendments to constitutional arrangement of legislative referendum. As such it exerted a signifi cant impact on the constitutional review of the legislative referendum, and therefore it is to be expected that it will take the Constitutional Court some time and decisionmaking in various referendum matters before constitutional case-law on referendum has fi nally been settled. 22
Constitutional practice on problematic referendum issues
Referendum decision-making distinguishes between constitutionally permissible referendums, where sensitive social issues can be decided, and constitutionally impermissible referendums. Th e latter entail all referendums whose implementation is explicitly prohibited by the Constitution, as well as those referendums where 19 More a majority vote could aff ect fundamental constitutional values. Referendum decisionmaking is in such cases prohibited by the principle of constitutional democracy, 23 essentially placing fundamental constitutional values above the majority vote, be it a parliamentary majority or even a referendum majority.
Prior to the amendment of constitutional arrangement of legislative referendum in 2013, prohibitions and restrictions on referendum decision-making had not been laid down in the Constitution, and consequently, the Constitutional Court reviewed each particular case, in line with Article 21 of the Referendum and Popular Initiative Act, required by the National Assembly, whether delaying adoption of law or its refusal in a referendum could cause unconstitutional consequences. In case the review of the Court found no unconstitutional consequences, the demand of the National Assembly was rejected, and consequently, the referendum was allowed; otherwise, the decision of the Constitutional Court prohibited the referendum. On the whole, there have been eight reviews of permissibility to call an approval legislative referendum by the Constitutional Court. In one instance, the request of the National Assembly was lodged late and was therefore rejected, in four other instances referendum decisionmaking was prohibited, whereas in three cases it was allowed. 24 Current constitutional arrangement excludes four groups of laws from referendum. 25 In line with new constitutional arrangement National Assembly decides on permissibility to call a referendum. In case of a dispute between the proposer of a referendum and the National Assembly, which rejected to call a referendum, the Constitutional Court will decide on this matter. Th e main question of this dispute is whether the National Assembly rejected to call a referendum on a law that is formally and substantially excluded from referendum by the Constitution. Moreover, a constitutional review of permissibility to call a referendum on other laws is not excluded, especially when protecting important constitutional principles and values. 26 In line with new constitutional arrangement the Constitutional Court decided on permissibility to call a referendum in two instances, allowing to call a referendum in one case and rejecting the other. 27
23
More on the principle of constitutional democracy in referendum matters see: B. Žuber, Ustavnosodni nadzor zakonodajnega referenduma z vidika nekaterih temeljnih ustavnih načel, Pravnik, 2017, no. 9/10, pp. 623-352, 731-732. 24 More on this see: B. , 2015, no. 6/7, pp. 1345-357. As an example of referendum decision-making on sensitive social issues, the following referendums are presented -namely the Family Code referendum, 28 carried out on 25 March 2012, and the referendum on Act Amending the Marriage and Family Relations Act (hereinaft er ZZZDR-D), 29 carried out on 20 December 2015. Both the Family Code and ZZZDR-D similarly aff ected the regulation of domestic communities and family relations. Th e following provisions were assessed as the most controversial by the general public:
broadening of the term family to a community between a child and an adult who is neither their parent nor adoptive parent, determining a partnership as a domestic community of two women or two men, where equal legal consequences apply as for a marriage, unless otherwise provided by the law, changes regarding adoptions, where it was foreseen that partners in a civil partnership or an extramarital union are not allowed to adopt children together, however, a partner in a civil partnership or a partner in an extramarital union can adopt the child of their partner.
For similar reasons, the general public viewed ZZZDR-D as socially particularly problematic as well. Th e act modifi ed the defi nition of a marriage stipulating that a marriage is a regulated community of two people, introducing same-sex marriage in place of same-sex civil partnership, and equating same-sex non-marital partnerships with heterosexual non-marital partnerships. Both the Family Code as well as ZZZDR-D eliminated unconstitutionalities in individual acts established by the Constitutional Court, comprehensively regulated and equated same-sex and heterosexual couples in all rights and obligations at general and system level respectively. 30 In the referendum, the voters fi rst rejected the Family Code, followed by ZZZDR-D as well. Th e main issue of the referendums on these two acts was the fact that the majority decided on the rights of a stigmatised and discriminated minority, namely same-sex couples, endeavouring for a recognition of their dignity and equality before the law. Such decision-making and potential prejudicing of constitutional rights of a minority could have been prevented solely by an advance prohibition of 28 Relevant materials for preparation and adoption of Family code are available at: http://web. archive.org/web/20110926104357/www.mddsz.gov.si/si/delovna_podrocja/druzina/zakonska_ zveza_in_druzinska_razmerja/druzinski_zakonik1/ (access 11.11.2018). 29
Relevant materials for preparation and adoption of ZZZDR-D are available at: http://www.pisrs. si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO5751 (access 11.11.2018 the referendum, which did not occur since the Constitutional Court had allowed both referendums and thus left the fi nal decision on the rights of a minority in voters' hands. Th e Family Code referendum was carried out on the basis of the previous regulation of legislative referendum. It was the opinion of the National Assembly that further delaying the implementation or on the basis of the rejection of the Family Code, unconstitutional consequences would occur in terms of non-compliance with the Constitutional Court decision as well as non-equivalence between same-sex and heterosexual partners, and it was thus proposed that the decision be made by the Constitutional Court. Th e Court adopted an exceptionally technical decision that took the profession and the general public by surprise. 31 Th e decision to allow the referendum was justifi ed by the Court as follows: "Due to the fact that the Family Code starts to apply not earlier than one year following its implementation, the outcome of the referendum will not infl uence the occurrence of unconstitutional consequences. In the event of the rejection of the Family Code at the referendum as well as in the event of its confi rmation, the legal position remains the same, and thus one year aft er the promulgation of the decision adopted at the referendum, the Marriage and Family Relations Act and the Registration of Same-Sex Civil Partnership Act will still apply. Th is period is the same, with minor deviations, as the period in which the National Assembly is bound by a referendum decision in accordance with the Referendum and Public Initiative Act. Th e possible rejection of the Family Code at the referendum can therefore not cause unconstitutional consequences. " 32 Th e referendum on ZZZDR-D was carried out in view of the current constitutional arrangement of the referendum expressly providing for restrictions and prohibitions of referendum decision-making. Th e request to call the referendum on ZZZDR-D was rejected by the National Assembly by means of a decision stating that referendum decision-making on an act that eliminates the unconstitutionality and equates same-sex and heterosexual couples in all rights and obligations is not admissible(fourth indent of the second paragraph of Article 90 of the Constitution). Referendum petitioners disputed the decision before the Constitutional Court which repealed the decision and allowed referendum decision-making. Th e explanation stated: "Th e wording of the fourth indent of the second paragraph of Article 90 of the Constitution, which refers to the elimination of an unconstitutionality, is to be understood in a manner such that it is not admissible to call a referendum only with regard to laws that eliminate an unconstitutionality that the Constitutional Court has already established by a decision and also with regard to laws eliminating a violation Th e fourth indent of the second paragraph of Article 90 of the Constitution cannot be interpreted in such a manner that it is not admissible to call a referendum in cases where the legislature adopts a statutory regulation by which it indirectly, by means of the eff ects that such statutory regulation produces in other legal fi elds, eliminates an unconstitutionality that the Constitutional Court or the European Court of Human Rights has already established. " 33 Th e decision was severely criticised by the professional public for it limits the constitutional provision on the prohibition of referendum in respect of elimination of unconstitutionality, making it inadmissible in constitutional democracy. 34 Th e case of the Family Code referendum and the referendum on ZZZDR-D proved legislative referendum an inappropriate means for resolving controversial social issues in cases when referendum decision-making prejudices the rights of minorities and prevents the elimination of rights violation respectively. Th e essence of referendum decision-making is to let the voters make a decision on suitability of a specifi c law which is in line with the Constitution, but not a decision whether violation of the rights of minorities should continue to take place.
Impact of legislative referendum on political and legal system
In Slovenia, referendum practice has undoubtedly had a signifi cant impact on the legal system. Increasing implementation of legislative referendums in practice has highlighted weaknesses and shortcomings of the referendum arrangement. 35 New constitutional arrangement on legislative referendum is beyond doubt more appropriate than the previous one. Th e implementation of rejective legislative referendum with rejection quorum as well as determination of referendum prohibitions and restrictions have proved particularly eff ective in practice. As indicated in the previous point of this article, all open issues of referendum decisionmaking cannot be resolved by means of a constitutional amendment. Th ere are certain decisions in the referendum procedure which are inevitably left to the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court, and subsequently, voters as well. All of them should make a joint eff ort to seek balance between the right to referendum decision-making and protection of constitutional democracy. Th e problem of referendums in Slovenia is the disinterest of voters in referendum outcome, commonly resulting in high voting abstinence. 36 Providing voters with information, which can be ensured in various manners and in various time periods, is essential in respect of exercising the right to a free vote. Th e impact of the media on the formation of public opinion on specifi c socially relevant issues is undoubtedly powerful. However, what has been called into question lately is not the role of the media in referendum campaigns, but the role of the government.
One of the critical ways of informing voters is a referendum campaign, which is specifi cally regulated in the Election and Referendum Campaign Act. 37 In March 2018, the Constitutional Court established the unconstitutionality of this act and stated in its decision: "Th e statutory regulation determined by the fi rst paragraph of Article 3 of the Election and Referendum Campaign Act, which enables the Government to participate in a referendum campaign as an organiser in the same manner as all other organisers of such, entails an excessive interference with the right to participate in the management of public aff airs determined by Article 44 of the Constitution, which protects the right to vote in a legislative referendum determined by the third paragraph of Article 90 of the Constitution. " 38 Th e Constitutional court explained that in view of its constitutional position, the Government is authorised and may even have the obligation to advocate in a public debate a law adopted by the National Assembly and to present its position thereon, and it may also present the consequences of the law not entering into force that it deems negative. Th e Government can also fulfi l this duty during a referendum campaign; however, it must convey information in a fair and reserved manner, namely information both in favour of and opposing the law at issue. Nevertheless, the Government may express its position thereon. Th us, such provision of information must be objective, comprehensive, and transparent. However, referendum propaganda is incompatible with the position of the Government in the system of state power. 39 Aside from legal, this decision had numerous political impacts as well. In view of the decision, the Slovenian Supreme Court decided that the government should not have allocated budget funds for appearance in the referendum campaign, and furthermore, that its actions might have aff ected the referendum outcome. Th e Court consequently repealed referendum voting on the Act on the Construction and Management of the Second Railway Track of the Divača to Koper Railway Line and ordered a new one In light of the Supreme Court decision, the Slovenian Prime Minister at the time resigned, and the action was followed by a call to early elections to the National Assembly.
Conclusion
Slovenia is among the countries with a developed system of direct democracy, which is demonstrated by the number of implemented legislative referendums in practice. It was referendum practice in itself that highlighted the shortcomings of the constitutional arrangement of legislative referendum and paved the way to a change in constitutional arrangement. One could say, Slovenia has a very well-established legal basis for referendum decision-making at normative level. Nevertheless, referendum practice continues to raise new issues that need to be resolved by subjects involved on a continuous basis, all the while seeking balance between the right to a referendum and any other values that stand in the way of this right, In the past, Slovenians have been face-to-face with referendums on socially sensitive issues as well. Th e referendum has not proved to be an appropriate means of resolving socially sensitive dilemmas in all cases when the implementation of the referendum could prevent elimination of unconstitutionality, as well as in cases when a referendum decision confl icts with constitutional values.
Referendum decision-making in Slovenia is aff ected by numerous factors. Recently, the problem of referendums seems to be the disinterest of voters in referendum outcome, resulting in referendum voting abstinence. Voters can obtain most information on the subject of the referendum from the referendum campaign. Unlike in some other countries, what has been called into question lately is not the position of the media in referendum campaigns, but the role of the government. As of now, the government is not allowed to be an organiser of a unilateral referendum campaign; nevertheless, it can take part in it and transparently, objectively, wholly and in a balanced way provide the public with information, and in doing so, is allowed to use budget funds to this end.
